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As a result of his celebrated visit to the United States in the early
nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville remarked on the tendency of the
Americans to resort to legal action to resolve most of their social problems.1
What was a sophisticated and subtle observation nearly two centuries ago
remains an astute commentary on our culture, describing one of the most
controversial aspects of our society. Although Americans' "tendency" to rely
on the legal system to resolve many of their disputes is troubling to some,2 it
certainly can be perceived as evidence that the United States has been
successful, to some degree, in establishing "a government of laws and not of
men."3 In recent years, however, our legal system has begun to show the
strain of being an "all-purpose remedy that American society provides to its
aggrieved members." 4
Although the population of the United States has increased slightly over
200% from 1904 to 1995, civil case filings in the federal district courts for
the same period have increased 1,424%. 5 Despite this astounding increase in
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I See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 357 (Francis Bowen ed. &
Henry Reeve trans., 2d ed. 1863) (1835).
2 Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court William H. Rehnquist stated in
the 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary that the increase in federal litigation is
"one of the most serious problems" confronting the federal courts. William H. Rehnquist,
The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1999, at 1, 2.
3 JOHN ADAMS, NOVANGLUS: OR, A HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE WITH AMERICA, FROM
ITS ORIGIN, IN 1754, TO THE PRESENT TIME, NOVANGLUS PAPER No. 7 (1774), reprinted
in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, at 106, 106 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851).
4 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 10 (1983).
5 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS 10 (1995).
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litigation, the number of district judges has not increased proportionally, and
both the number of cases each judge must adjudicate and the complexity of
those cases continue to increase. 6 As a result of this mounting burden on the
court, the federal judiciary itself has concluded that the "increasing
atomization of society, its stubborn litigiousness.... and, paradoxically, the
very popularity and success of the federal courts, have combined to strain the
courts' ability to perform their mission." 7
One way the federal courts have attempted to respond to the threat of an
increasingly voluminous and diverse caseload has been to develop "court-
annexed" alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs that provide
litigants with an opportunity to resolve their disputes through nontraditional
means such as mediation, arbitration, and early neutral evaluation. 8
Mediation, by far, has been the most widely adopted of these programs. 9 The
hope and promise of court-annexed mediation programs are twofold: First,
and to some foremost, it is intended to provide litigants with a means of
resolving their dispute so as to avoid the delays and high cost often
associated with traditional litigation. 10 Second, it is a flexible process that is
6 See id. (stating that "[b]etween 1970 and 1995, district court filings per judgeship
increased from 317 to 436" and that "although complexity is difficult to quantify, most
commentators would agree that the average case has increased in complexity"); see also
id. at 15-16 (setting forth projections of future litigation growth and potential judicial
resources). Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist warned:
Unless actions are taken to reverse current trends, or slow them considerably,
the federal courts of the future will be dramatically changed. Few will welcome
those changes. Some will say that we merely need to create more federal judgeships,
which in turn would require more courthouses and supporting staff. The long term
implications of expanding the federal judiciary should give everyone pause.
William H. Rehnquist, Remarks Before the House of Delegates at the American Bar
Association's Mid-year Meeting (Feb. 4, 1992).
7 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OFTHE U.S., supra note 5, at 9.
8 For example, see the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 § 112, 28 U.S.C. § 471 note
(1994) (Congressional Statement of Findings), which states that the CJRA was passed to
address the "problems of cost and delay in civil litigation" within the federal courts and
which specifically encouraged the use of ADR programs to accomplish that goal, id.
"Evidence suggests that an effective litigation management and cost delay reduction
program should incorporate several interrelated principles, including... utilization of
alternative dispute resolution programs in appropriate cases." Id. For further discussion,
see generally ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SET7LEMENT IN
THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1996), which details the ADR programs and procedures
in each of the U.S. federal district courts.
9 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 8, at 4.
10 See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, § 2, 112
Stat. 2993, 2993 (1998).
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tailorable to a variety of disputes. 11 It permits parties to emphasize interests
that traditional litigation is typically ill-suited to promote, such as
relationship building and honest constructive communication that might
permit the parties to resolve their dispute in a manner so that both are able to
achieve their important objectives.' 2
While mediation's ability to offer a flexible and satisfying dispute
resolution process that is typically not possible in litigation has gained wide
acceptance, 13 there is ongoing debate as to whether ADR programs
successfully accomplish their goal of reducing court congestion and saving
time and money. 14 The Rand Institute for Civil Justice studied several federal
district courts' mediation and early neutral evaluation programs over a four
year period and found "no strong statistical evidence that the mediation or
neutral evaluation programs, as implemented .... significantly affected time
to disposition, litigation costs, or attorney views of fairness or satisfaction
with case management."'1 5 A different study of three districts, however,
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center found the use of ADR more
promising. 16 It found that approximately fifty percent of the attorneys
questioned believed that ADR reduced costs and approximately forty percent
believed it saved time. 17 However, only one district's data supported a
finding that time actually was saved.18
1 See Wayne D. Brazil, Why Should Courts Offer Nonbinding ADR Services?, 16
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS LITIG. 65, 74 (1998). Another potential benefit of
mediation is the "increased level of party participation in and control over decisions."
Robert A. Baruch Bush, What Do We Need a Mediator For?": Mediation's "Value-
Added" for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 27 (1996).
12 See Bush, supra note 11, at 27; see also ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 4 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991).
13 See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 92 (1985).
14 See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 § 2, 112 Stat. at 2993. Obviously
the actual benefits of ADR are the subject of intense debate and study but are generally
beyond the scope of this Article.
15 See JAMES S. KAKILAK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF
MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
at xxxiv (1996).
16 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
IN COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF FIVE
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF
1990, at 7-10 (1997).
17 See id.
18 See id.
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Compounding the above concerns is that only a small percentage of
federal litigants voluntarily avail themselves of ADR programs. 19 Given the
federal government's stated commitment to these programs and its apparent
desire to integrate ADR methods firmly into the federal court landscape,
interest may arise naturally regarding the cause of such a low rate of
voluntary participation in federal mediation and how to improve these
numbers. For example, are the programs not being implemented as
effectively as they might be? If this is so, it is appropriate to evaluate what
changes can be made to increase effectiveness and enhance litigants'
confidence in these programs.
It is also possible, however, that litigants are hesitant to entrust their
rights to such programs because of our cultural history regarding the nature
of dispute resolution in the United States. A country's procedures for
resolving disputes are interconnected with its culture.20 Therefore, before
implementing new procedural methods in a society, it is important to
consider whether the procedure is consistent with the values of the culture
and, hence, capable of garnering the public confidence necessary to achieve
substantial acceptance of the new procedure. Historically, Americans have
been accustomed to achieving justice through enforcement of the "rule of
law" in an adversarial litigation context.21 Therefore, in crafting and
implementing mediation programs in the federal courts, sensitivity should be
given when addressing whether American society, which traditionally has
sought unyielding protection of individual rights, can accept dispute
resolution in a setting that could be perceived as encouraging the
compromise and forfeiture of rights.
In making this evaluation, it may be useful to examine and compare the
culture of the People's Republic of China, where voluntary mediation has
long been a fully accepted and integrated part of its legal system. Voluntary
mediation is regarded as the favored method of dispute resolution in China
and accounts for the resolution of more than sixty percent of all cases filed in
China's courts.22 Closer study of China's legal system reveals that the status
19 See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & MARGARET SHAW, CENTER FOR PUB. RESOURCES,
COURT ADR: ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM DESIGN 15 (1992) (quoting Wayne D. Brazil,
Institutionalizing ADR Programs in Courts, in EMERGING ADR ISSUES IN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 52 app. C at 122 (Frank E. A. Sander ed., 1991)). U.S. Magistrate
Judge Wayne D. Brazil states that because few litigants voluntarily use ADR programs,
"volunteer programs are not likely to contribute significantly to cost and delay
reduction." Brazil, supra, at app. C at 122.
20 See Oscar G. Chase, Legal Process and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 9 (1997).
21 See AUERBACH, supra note 4, at 3.
22 See Jun Ge, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the
People's Republic of China, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 122, 128 (1996). In 1986,
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of mediation in China is largely a product of a combination of Chinese
cultural values and the historical evolution of China, which naturally differs
vastly from that of the United States. Nonetheless, the Chinese legal system
has been one of the world's most committed institutions in the use of
mediation to resolve disputes and a leader in developing ways to maximize
its benefits and effectiveness. 23 Consideration of the methods employed there
may be warranted to determine whether there are any aspects of that system
which can be borrowed successfully by the federal courts.
Part of the process of borrowing any aspect of China's mediation
approach, however, first requires that the federal courts consider whether the
values embodied in China's mediation program are compatible with
American values with regard to dispute resolution, such that public
confidence in the system will not be undermined. This Article demonstrates
that China's "court-performed" mediation model is consistent with American
dispute resolution practices and is both a culturally acceptable and a valuable
means of reaching settlement in the federal courts. Although United States
federal courts and litigants have not yet fully embraced mediation, they have
embraced the practice of resolving disputes through judicially assisted
settlement conferences, which are an integral part of our civil justice system
and functionally similar to mediation in China. Unlike China, however,
mediation in the United States district courts is not "court-performed," but
rather "court-annexed." While federal district courts participate in the
settlement conference through the presence of federal judges, the federal
courts' participation in the mediation process is far more limited. By
adopting a more court-performed mediation model like that of China's, the
federal courts will enhance the credibility of mediation, thus inspiring greater
use and participation in it and thereby help to transform the way our society
resolves disputes.
II. MEDIATION IN CHINA
"It is better to die of starvation than to become a thief; it is better to be
vexed to death than to bring a lawsuit. ",24
A. Cultural and Political Roots of Mediation in China
For more than two thousand years, mediation, or tiaojie, has been the
primary means of resolving disputes in China.25 The popularity of mediation
Chinese courts resolved one million civil and economic cases within its courts through
mediation, constituting 61.5% of all the matters handled by the courts in that year. See id.
23 See id.
24 Ancient Chinese Proverb.
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as a method of dispute resolution in China is a product of primarily three
related but distinct sociopolitical forces-Confucian philosophy, an
inadequate and underdeveloped legal system, and Maoist principles. Each of
these factors, which are grounded in both the cultural values and the
historical development of China, discouraged the use of formal litigation and
fostered the resolution of disputes through private settlement, often with the
assistance of a third party.
1. Confucian Philosophy
Confucian philosophy, which dominated Chinese culture for more than
two thousand years and is still a significant force in modem Chinese
society,26 traditionally encouraged individuals to settle their disputes
privately and, if necessary, involve the community, extended family, clans,
and guilds for dispute resolution assistance.27 Confucius taught that the
primary goal of all human endeavors, including government, is to promote
and preserve the natural harmony that existed among men and between man
and nature.28 It was a person's duty, according to Confucius, to preserve
harmony through one's behavior, guided by the rules of polite conduct (li).29
Litigation, a form of conflict, disrupted the natural harmony and amounted to
25 Justice Robert F. Utter, Dispute Resolution in China, 62 WASH. L. REv. 383,
384-87 (1987). At least one commentator has emphasized the importance in
distinguishing between external dispute resolution and internal dispute resolution within
the Chinese society. See Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution in China, 5 J. CHINESE L.
245, 248-49 (1991). External dispute resolution refers to a third party (mediator,
arbitrator, or adjudicator) "who has no distinct relationship with the parties other than a
specialized function as a dispute resolver." Id. at 248. Internal dispute resolution refers to
a circumstance where the dispute resolver "has authority not because of [her] specialized
function as dispute resolver but because of some other distinct relationship with the
parties," for example, a family member or an executive of a company resolving a dispute
between two subordinate employees. Id. It is suggested that where internal resolution is
used the lines between mediation, arbitration, and adjudication are blurred because "the
dispute resolver is in a position to impose an outcome no matter what mode is ostensibly
used." Id. at 249. A discussion of internal dispute resolution is beyond the scope of this
Article.
26 See Utter, supra note 25, at 384, 387; see also Ren Jianxin, Mediation,
Conciliation, Arbitration and Litigation in the People's Republic of China, in CONTRACT,
GUANXI, AND DIsPuTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 363, 363 (Tahirih V. Lee ed., 1997).
27 See Robert Perkovich, A Comparative Analysis of Community Mediation in the
United States and the People's Republic of China, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 313, 316
(1996); Utter, supra note 25, at 386.
28 See Perkovich, supra note 27, at 314.
29 See id.
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"a public admission of some personal failing... "30 The Chinese therefore
came to embrace compromise or yielding (jang) as the socially acceptable
way to resolve disputes, which "requires one to yield on some points in order
to gain some advantage on others. '31 Another Confucian principle which
influences conflict resolution is the "spirit of self-criticism." One who
assumes a spirit of self-criticism examines his conduct to determine whether
it is the cause of the conflict.32 This humbling act, in turn, invokes a positive
response from the other party and hopefully leads to harmony.33 Thus,
mediation always has been consistent with Confucian values.
2. An Inadequate and Under-Developed Court System
The popularity of mediation in imperial China was in large measure also
attributable to an inaccessible and inadequate court system.34 Many localities
had no court, and litigants often were forced to travel great distances to lodge
formal civil claims. 35 If litigants could overcome the obstacle of distance or
were fortunate enough to live close to courts, their case was handled by
magistrates or magistrate assistants that had no legal training and who often
were corrupt.36 The magistrates or their assistants were known to accept
bribes and extort "customary fees" from litigants, which led to a general
distrust of the courts and which gave rise to the expression "win your lawsuit
and lose your money." 37 Magistrates also were frequently "harsh and
degrading" to litigants.38 It was not unusual for the court to use torture to
obtain evidence from a litigant or to incarcerate him pending trial and during
a prolonged appeal process. 39
Despite the advent of the rule of law (fa) during the third century B.C.,
which slowly wove its way into Confucian principles, imperial China
retained its strong bias against lawsuits embodied in Confucian principles.40
Imperial rulers were unconcerned with the inadequacies and corruption that
plagued the court system. Imperial philosophy toward litigation and the
30 Utter, supra note 25, at 385.
31 Perkovich, supra note 27, at 315.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See Utter, supra note 25, at 386.
35 See id. at 385.
36 See id.
37 Id.; see also Perkovich, supra note 27", at 316.
38 Utter, supra note 25, at 385.
39 See id. at 385-86.
40 See id. at 384.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
frequent abuses of the courts are captured in a statement made by the K' ang-
hsi Emperor (1662-1722):
[L]awsuits would tend to increase to a frightful amount, if people were not
afraid of the tribunals, and if they felt confident of always finding in them
ready and perfect justice .... I desire, therefore, that those who have
recourse to the tribunals should be treated without pity, and in such a
manner that they shall be disgusted with [the] law, and tremble to appear
before a magistrate. 41
Such sentiments paint a grim picture of the plight of litigants in imperial
China and, not surprisingly, encouraged mediation's widespread use and
popularity.
3. Maoist Thought
With the onset of communism in China in the twentieth century, the
popularity and acceptance of mediation continued as it was, viewed as
furthering the notions of social harmony which characterize communist
thought. After the overthrow of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911, China was
embattled in a tumultuous and bloody political struggle over the country's
leadership, from which the Communists ultimately emerged victorious.42 As
a result, the People's Republic of China was established in 1949 under the
leadership of Mao Zedong (Mao), and the process of creating a new legal
system modeled after the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
began.43
Mao immediately recognized how the deeply rooted Confucian concepts
of compromise and self-criticism mirrored and served communist ideals and
goals.44 Analogous to Confucian thought, Mao believed that in a communist
society, individual interests should be de-emphasized in favor of promoting
social harmony and the common good on behalf of society as a unit.
Therefore, disputes between individuals in a communist society should be
"resolved not through defeat of one party over the other, but by the
movement of both to a new plane of unity higher than the one out of which
41 Id. at 386 (quoting Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of
Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1215 (1966) (quoting THOMAS R. JERNIGAN,
CHINA IN LAW AND COMMERCE 191 (1905) (quoting statement of the K'ang hsi
Emperor)).
42 See Perkovich, supra note 27, at 317.
43 See id.
44 See id. at 318.
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the [dispute] originally developed."45 Thus, the Communist party adopted
mediation as a means to promote social harmony and control, conducting
mediation with the assistance of "party cadres" 46 or People's Mediation
Committees (Committees). 47 In addition to resolving disputes and avoiding
the cost, delay, and "undesirable dissonance" of litigation, mediation by party
members or organizations also served as a means of "educating" the people
and implementing party policy. 48
B. Mediation in Modem China
Mediation continues to be China's most popular method for resolving
disputes4 9 and is an integral part of civil procedure in its court system. 50
Unlike the United States, the Chinese judiciary is not a separate, coequal
branch of government within the Chinese legal system, but rather one of
many "arms" of the central government, lacking the independence, power,
and prestige often associated with our court system.51 Litigation in this
environment often is perceived as lacking the impartiality and fairness that
Americans typically enjoy and contributes to the preference of the Chinese
for mediation. Although China is seeking to create a more modem legal
system committed to the rule of law in order to engender greater confidence
in its ability to adjudicate cases fairly, for the benefit of its own citizens as
45 Clarke, supra note 25, at 286.
46 "Party cadres" are party members or government or quasi-government officials.
See Utter, supra note 25, at 387.
47 See Clarke, supra note 25, at 270.
48 Perkovich, supra note 27, at 318.
49 See id. at 313.
50 See Clarke, supra note 25, at 270. The other prominent forum for mediation is in
the Committees. The 1982 Constitution required that all resident and village committees
create People's Mediation Committees to serve as alternate forums to the people's courts.
See Perkovich, supra note 27, at 321. Committees are by far the most widely used forums
for mediation in China. See id. It is estimated that for every civil dispute filed in court
"five or ten are resolved by the Committees." Id. Embodying the Confucian principles 6f
"harmony and yielding," the Committees are required to be formed within all
neighborhoods, villages, and workplaces with the purpose of mediating minor civil and
criminal disputes. Id; see also Clarke, supra note 25, at 276. The Committees operate
under the supervision of China's lower-level courts and are considered quasi-
governmental entities, utilizing mediators elected from the community in which the
committee functions. See Perkovich, supra note 27, at 324; see also RONALD C. BROWN,
UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURTS AND LEGAL PROCESS: LAW WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS 22 (1997); Clarke, supra note 25, at 276-79.
51 See Susan Finder, The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China,
7J. CHINESEL. 145, 148 (1993).
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well as to compete in the international economic market, it is still deeply
committed to the concept of institutionalized mediation. 52
1. The Role and Structure of the Court
Litigants regard litigation in China as often arbitrary and unpredictable,
inspiring little confidence in the results obtained there. There are a variety of
factors contributing to this view, including corruption among judges and the
lack of an organized, published, and accessible digest of applicable law to
support a claim. 53 Furthermore, the policy, functioning, and, not infrequently,
the decisions of the court are influenced by other branches of the government
or the Communist party either directly or indirectly, undermining its power
and independence. 54 The perceived lack of impartiality among China's
judges, coupled with their poor education and training, creates a rather
unreliable environment for litigants seeking to protect or vindicate their
rights. Moreover, enforcement of judgments is often very difficult and
complicated, leaving a successful litigant without the benefit of a practical
remedy. 55
Despite their constitutionally proclaimed judicial power, independence,
and prestige,56 China's courts possess little of these characteristics. The
52 See BROWN, supra note 50, at 26; Jianxin, supra note 26, at 364 (stating that the
people's courts of China "have tried to combine mediation with litigation in the best
possible way"). But see Perkovich, supra note 27, at 320. The Chinese principle of
"mediation first, litigation second" has come under scrutiny. See Fu Hauling,
Understanding People's Mediation in Post-Mao China, 6 J. CHINESE L. 211, 219 (1992).
Institutionalized encouragement of mediation, however, is seen by some to be a "barrier"
to establishing the rule of law because it promotes a system of civil justice that de-
emphasizes legal rights. Id. at 221 (citing Zhang Xingzhong, Zhuozhong Taijie Yuanze
Zhi Wojian [My Opinion About the Principle of Emphasizing Mediation], FAZHI RIBAO
[LEGAL DAILY], May 22, 1990, at 1). Mediation also is seen as preventing economic
development because "'primitive, unlimited, and repeated mediation slows down the
capital turnover, wastes energy and damages the economy."' Id. (quoting Xingzhong,
supra, at 1). Finally, it is argued that because mediation is principally "ideological work"
and not based on the rule of law, it stymies the development of the legal profession,
especially judges whose professional skills will not be enhanced. Id.
53 See Clarke, supra note 25, at 258-64.
54 See Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming China's Civil Procedure: Judging the Courts,
45 AM. J. COMP. L. 793, 798 (1997).
55 See Clarke, supra note 25, at 263-64.
56 The Chinese Constitution states that the people's courts are the "judicial organs of
the state," ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution of the People's
Republic of China] art. 123 (1982), and that "[t]he people's courts shall, in accordance
with the law, exercise judicial power independently and are not subject to interference by
administrative organs, public organizations or individuals," id. art. 126.
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judiciary is not a separate branch of government in the traditional separation
of powers model, but rather one of many distinct governmental organs
answerable to several different political entities, the most prominent of which
are the National People's Congress (NPC), the local government, and the
Communist party.57
The NPC is the supreme legislature of China.58 The NPC and its
executive body, the Standing Committee, are empowered constitutionally to
"supervise" the court. 59 Although there is academic debate within China over
whether, in the exercise of its supervisory role, the NPC can inquire into the
merits of ongoing litigation, it does so regularly.60 Typically, however, the
NPC will inquire only into litigation that involves a controversial issue.61 In
such a case, the NPC representative for the district in which the case is
venued will write the court a proposal as to how the matter might be
resolved, to which the court must reply within three months.62 Additionally,
while all courts are part of a national system, each is also part of the
corresponding level of government that it serves. Accordingly, each level of
government, whether county, city, or central, exerts considerable control over
the corresponding court's work because it provides for court facilities,
personnel, and finances. 63
It is the Communist party, however, that exerts the greatest influence on
the courts.64 The Communist party, through its central legal committee and
committees at the corresponding level of government, sets legal policy and
closely supervises the courts' work.65 The "supervisory" role of the
Communist party at times has included direct involvement with important
judicial cases, although the stated policy of the Communist party is not to
interfere with the daily functioning of the courts.66 Judges are required to
57 See Finder, supra note 51, at 148-50.
58 See Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 731-
32, 733-34 (1994). The NPC and its executive body, the Standing Committee, are the
only arms of Chinese government that may enact national laws. See id. at 721.
59 ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA art. 67, § 6 (1982).
60 See Finder, supra note 51, at 153.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See Keller, supra note 58, at 754.
64 See Finder, supra note 51, at 148-52.
65 See id. at 149.
66 See ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA art. 67, § 6 (1982); Cohen, supra
note 54, at 797-98; Finder, supra note 51, at 151-53. The Communist party's Central
Committee issued a directive in 1979 indicating that it would not interfere with the "day
to day operation of the court or in individual cases, but rather would monitor judicial
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attend party meetings to keep informed of current party policy, and ninety
percent of them, because of the sensitive job they perform, are party
members. 67
Like most legal systems with a civil law approach, the judiciary consists
of career civil servants. 68 Unlike many other civil law countries, however,
China's judges have a history of being poorly educated and often corrupt,
reflecting poorly on the quality of the courts. 69 Judges, as career civil
servants, serve at the pleasure of the county, province, or city government
that appointed them,70 and they preside over a unified system of courts
consisting of four levels of general jurisdiction courts and various specialized
courts.71 As a consequence of judges' affiliations with local government,
political and local authorities can, and often do, exert significant influence
over judicial decisions.72 Thus, local protectionism, from which local
residents may derive distinct advantages in litigating with an "outsider" or
foreign country, is also a genuine concern. 73 Court personnel, including
work and exercise leadership only under general policy guidance." BROWN, supra note
50, at 128.
67 See Finder, supra note 51, at 149; see also Cohen, supra note 54, at 797.
68 See Cohen, supra note 54, at 795.
69 See id. at 795-97.
70 See Clarke, supra note 25, at 254-55.
71 See id. at 253; see also Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese
Court System: The Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 7 (1996).
The two lower general jurisdiction courts typically serve as courts of first instance. See
id. at 7. The Supreme People's Court (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan), controlled by the central
government, is the highest court in China and has supervisory power over and sets policy
for all other courts. See id.; see also ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA art. 127
(1982) (stating that the "Supreme People's Court supervises the administration of justice
by the local people's courts at different levels and by the special people's courts; people's
courts at higher levels supervise the administration of justice by those at lower levels");
Finder, supra note 51, at 163 (observing that the term "supervision" is a term of art in
Chinese politics and contrasting that term with the word "lead"). Each province, centrally
administered city, and autonomous region has a Higher Level People's Court (Gaoji
Renmin Fayuan). See Clarke, supra, at 7. Underneath the Higher People's Courts are the
Intermediate Level People's Courts (Zhongji Renmin Fayuan), which are present within
centrally administered cities, prefectures, and provincially administered cities. See id.
Finally, at the county level reside the lowest levels of courts called the Basic Level
People's Courts (Jiceng Renmin Fayuan). See id. Basic Level People's Courts, however,
are permitted to establish branch courts known as People's Tribunals (Renmin Fating) in
outlying or remote areas. See id. at 7. Judgments rendered in People's Tribunals are of the
same force and effect as Basic Level People's Courts and if appealed are brought to the
Intermediate Level People's Courts. See id.
72 See Clarke, supra note 25, at 262-63.
73 See id. (discussing influence by local government); Cohen, supra note 54, at 799-
800 (discussing local protectionism).
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judges, need not have legal training and until only recently did not have to
satisfy any minimum educational requirements.74 Although there is. a
movement currently underway to improve the quality of China's judiciary by
providing for minimum educational requirements, training, and examination,
many of the judges presently sitting are poorly educated, especially at the
Basic Level People's Court where the majority of first instance cases are
adjudicated.75
Even when a judge has -the appropriate legal education and training,
finding applicable law to support one's claim is often a daunting, if not
impossible, task. Updated indexes are often not available to facilitate locating
applicable law.76 There are frequently no statutes relevant to the disputed
issue and the laws that are in place are sometimes contradictory. 77 To further
complicate the judge's task, there is no systematic and reliable method of
case reporting.78
A Chinese litigant's obstacles to securing civil justice, however, do not
end with obtaining a valid judgment against her adversary, as civil judgments
are often difficult to enforce for several reasons. Unlike the United States,
there are few penalties in China for disregarding a court judgment or order.79
Courts also lack sufficient political authority to enforce judgments against
administrative agencies because in general, the executive arm of government
is more powerful than the judiciary.80 Finally, local authorities, upon which
the courts must rely to enforce judgments, are typically reluctant to coerce
payment of the judgment. 81 This is especially true when the judgment is from
74 See Cohen, supra note 54, at 794-96.
75 See id.; see also Clarke, supra note 25, at 257-60.
76 See Clarke, supra note 25, at 258-59. China is making strides in remedying the
problem of the lack of an organized and accessible body of law upon which judges can
rely to adjudicate disputes with a reasonable degree of consistency. In particular, since
1978 China has expended considerable effort to codify its contract law. See Zhong
Jianhua & Yu Guanghua, China's Uniform Contract Law: Progress. and Problems, 17
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 3-9 (1999) (detailing China's various efforts to codify and
modernize its contract law). Most recently, on March 15, 1999, China enacted the
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Hetongfa), which is the most detailed and ambitious attempt China has made to organize
its contract law to date. See id. at 2.
77 See Clarke, supra note 25, at 259. The primary reason for the difficult and
incomplete means of ingress into Chinese law is that laws and regulations are passed by a
"bewildering" variety of governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. Id. at 258.
78 See id. at 258-59.
79 See id. at 263-64.
80 See id. at 265.
81 See id. at 265-66.
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a different province or city because of local protectionism.82 Thus, lack of
enforcement devices, insufficient political clout, and local protectionism
combine to make enforcement of civil judgments an uncertain enterprise.
Corruption by officials in China is another serious concern that extends to
the judiciary, although it is difficult to assess the magnitude of the problem.83
Corruption can range from stretching procedural rules for friends and
neighbors to more serious transgressions of accepting bribes to affect the
outcome of the dispute.84 One commentator relates that it is not uncommon
for a lawyer to take key judges on "fact-finding" trips ex parte that involve
accommodations at expensive hotels and restaurants that are paid for by the
litigant.85 Accordingly, political influences, the lack of educated judges who
are able to find and apply the law, widespread corruption and favoritism, and
judgment enforcement issues combine to create a rather suspect and
unpredictable court system. 86
2. Civil Procedure and Mediation
Given the historical unreliability of the litigation process in China, it is
not surprising that mediation plays a central role in China's ordinary
procedure for resolving civil disputes. 87 China's present Code of Civil
Procedure was adopted officially in 1991 after functioning almost ten years
on a provisional basis, 88 and an entire section of the Code is dedicated to
describing mediation's proper use, evidencing its prominence in China's
ordinary civil procedure. 89 Participation in mediation is voluntary, but judges
82 See id. at 266-67.
83 See id. at 259-60.
84 See Cohen, supra note 54, at 801.
85 See id. China's Civil Procedure Law prohibits a judge from "accepting a treat or
gift from the parties or their agents ad litem," and a recently enacted Judges Law also
prohibits judges from accepting bribes and other unsavory practices. Margaret Y. K.
Woo, Law and Discretion in the Contemporary Chinese Courts, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y
J. 581, 599 (1999). Despite these prohibitions and an increased commitment to the rule of
law, corruption is still seen as a significant problem in the Chinese judiciary. See id. at
582,599.
86 See Clarke, supra note 25, at 257-68.
87 The general category of civil cases subject to mediation "include[s] disputes over
property and status arising under civil law or the Marriage Law, as well as disputes
arising under economic law and labor law." Clarke, supra note 25, at 256.
88 See ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, INTRODUCTiON TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 152 (1992).
89 See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO MINSHI SUSONG FA [Civil Procedure Law
of the People's Republic of China] [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law] arts. 85-90.
Concerning China's procedure for litigation, a court of first instance can adjudicate a
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occasionally employ subtle, and sometimes more forceful, pressures to
encourage parties to mediate disputes. 90 Participation in mediation is
commonly expected of and anticipated by parties and is viewed by the courts
to be an efficient way to resolve disputes and promote social stability.91
The mediation process itself, which typically is conducted by a single
judge even if a collegiate panel of judges ultimately will hear the matter in
the event that a resolution cannot be reached, is informal and bears close
resemblance to an American settlement conference. While there is no parallel
provision in the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requiring a
judge to apply a particular set of values or even the law to facilitate a
settlement, in practice a Chinese mediation proceeds very much like a
settlement conference in America. The most similar feature between the two
processes is that neither employs a uniform method or system by which the
mediation or settlement is conducted. 92 In both systems, it is left to the
dispute in either an "ordinary procedure of first instance" or a "summary procedure."
CHEN, supra note 88, at 170. The summary procedure is merely a simplified version of
the ordinary procedure. See id. The case is heard by a single judge and may be presented
orally with no formal court investigation or debate, as are held in the ordinary procedure.
See id. at 172. The summary procedure is thought to be used in as many as 80% to 90%
of all civil cases adjudicated by the Basic Level People's Courts, although its widespread
use has come under some criticism. See id.
A civil action is commenced under the ordinary procedure by filing a writ with the
court. See id. at 170. If the court determines after examining the writ that the
requirements of a proper civil action have been met, it must commence the action within
seven days. See id. The writ is then served upon the defendant by the court, who has an
opportunity to file a defense. See id. The litigant is under an obligation to provide the
court with evidence to support his claim, although the court is under an obligation to
"investigate and collect" evidence it deems "necessary for the adjudication of the case or
which the litigant.., is unable to collect." Id. (citing Civil Procedure Law art. 64).
Generally, civil cases are tried by a collegiate bench composed of judges or of
judges and "people's assessors" who are selected from the community, although minor
civil matters may be tried by a single judge. See Clarke, supra note 71, at 11.
Additionally, each court has an "adjudication committee," composed of the court
president, vice president, and other important judges. See id. The adjudication committee
typically handles only particularly "sensitive" or "difficult" cases, but it also has the
power to overrule a verdict reached by a judge or collegiate panel within its court or a
lower court within its jurisdiction. Cohen, supra note 54, at 798. There is generally only
one appeal to the court of the next highest level. See CHEN, supra note 88, at 173. A
collegiate bench will review the appeal de novo, with or without a hearing, and its
decision is final. See id.
90 Interview with Zhu Zeng Jin, Visiting Scholar, New York University School of
Law, in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 10, 1999).
91 Interview with Jie Jie, Research Fellow, Institute of China Studies at New York
University School of Law, in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 10, 1999).
92 See Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary
System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 61-66 (1992); see also William L. Adams, Comment, Let's
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judge's discretion as to when, how long, and in what manner to conduct
mediation or a settlement conference. 93 This obviously leads, in both
systems, to great disparity in how each process is conducted even within each
system. Nevertheless, the Chinese judge uses many settlement techniques
that would be very familiar to his American counterpart. Chinese judges
often will meet separately with parties, something referred to in American
mediation terminology as "caucusing." 94 The judge sometimes will suggest a
settlement proposal he or she believes would be fair or point out to the
parties the particular weaknesses of their claim or defense, giving them cause
to re-evaluate the strength of their position. 95 Finally, a judge might simply,
as is done so often in the United States, emphasize the potential economic
benefits of a particular settlement whereby a litigant can avoid the additional
legal expense and uncertainty of court adjudication. 96
Chinese mediation differs from the American settlement conference in a
few ways. Article 85 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the People's Republic
of China provides that "[w]hen hearing a civil case, a people's court
shall ... conduct mediation on the basis of clear facts and distinguishing
from right and wrong." 97 Thus, within the theoretical framework of the
mediation process is an evaluative element in which the judge applies a set of
normative values to help facilitate settlement-values that are rooted in both
the judge's cultural and legal experience. 98 It is also of interest to note that
Chinese court mediation sessions are conducted at no additional expense to
the litigant, and, depending on the needs of the particular dispute, the court
may call witnesses99 and request assistance of "relevant units" and other
individuals. °00 However, since mediation most often occurs after the fact-
finding process, and thus after witnesses already have been heard, mediation
usually proceeds only with the parties. 101
Generally, when a settlement is reached through mediation, the court is
required to draft a "mediation statement" that "clearly states the claims of the
Make a Deal: Effective Utilization of Judicial Settlements in State and Federal Courts, 72
OR. L. REv. 427, 450 (1993); Interview with Zhu Zeng Jin, supra note 90.
93 See Adams, supra note 92, at 450-51; Interview with Zhu Zeng Jin, supra note
90.
94 See Adams, supra note 92, at 446-52.
95 See id. at 448.
96 See id. at 450.
97 Civil Procedure Law art. 85.
98 Interview with Zhu Zeng Jin, supra note 90.
99 See Civil Procedure Law art. 86.
100 Id. art. 87.
101 Interview with Zhu Zeng Jin, supra note 90.
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action, case facts and mediation conclusion."1 02 Once signed by the parties
and delivered, the mediation agreement has the force and effect of a court
judgment and may not be appealed.' 0 3 If pretrial attempts at mediation are
unsuccessful, the dispute proceeds to trial "without delay."' 04 Settlements
obtained through mediation are in some degree more valuable than
adjudicated court judgments because they cannot be appealed and are
voluntary, and thus there is a greater likelihood that all parties involved will
abide by the settlement.1 05 This is of particular importance because
judgments are often difficult to enforce in China.'0 6
IIH. MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
"A Government of Laws and Not of Men1 0 7
A. Cultural Roots and Statutory Basis for ADR in Federal
District Courts
Culturally, modem Americans are uneasy with the concept that justice is
possible outside of traditional litigation.' 08 In this individualistic "and
culturally diverse society, the law represents common values, and the ability
102 Civil Procedure Law art. 89. A court need not draft a mediation statement in the
following instances: (1) a divorce case in which the parties become reconciled following
mediation; (2) a case in which an adoptive relationship is maintained following the
mediation; (3) a case in which claims can be fulfilled immediately; and (4) other cases
which do not require a mediation statement. See Civil Procedure Law art. 90.
103 See id. arts. 89, 91.
104 Id. art. 91. The first stage of trial is the "court investigation." See CHEN, supra
note 88, at 172 (citing Civil Procedure Law art. 124). During the court investigation, the
court typically questions witnesses, reads statements of witnesses who could not attend,
and reviews documentary and material evidence presented by the parties. See id. (citing
Civil Procedure Law art. 124). The "court debate" follows the investigation, which
involves written and oral arguments by the parties. See id. (citing Civil Procedure Law
art. 127). Before the court renders a judgment, it will attempt, once again, to settle the
matter through mediation if it believes settlement is still possible. See id. (citing Civil
Procedure Law art. 128). The time limit for resolving a dispute under the ordinary
procedure is six months from the court's decision to initiate the action. See id. (citing
Civil Procedure Law art. 135).
105 See Clarke, supra note 25, at 257.
106 See Clarke, supra note 71, at 34-81 (discussing problems associated with the
execution ofjudgments in China).
107 ADAMS, supra note 3, at 106.
108 See AUERBACH, supra note 4, at 11.
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to sue thy neighbor is a cherished right. 10 9 The rule of law so dominates our
culture that it has been characterized as a "national religion" where "lawyers
constitute our priesthood; the courtroom is our cathedral, where
contemporary passion plays are enacted."' 10
The settling of disputes outside of traditional litigation and the courts,
however, is not a wholly alien concept to Americans. Many groups in our
nation's past preferred mediation or arbitration to resolving their disputes
publicly within the courts.111- For example, early colonial settlers like the
Dutch in New Amsterdam and the puritans of Massachusetts Bay as well as
colonial settlements in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina used
and preferred mediation or arbitration to resolve disputes. 112 As the
economic and social landscape of America changed and its population grew
and became more diverse, however, the rule of law changed and grew with it,
pervading and dominating our relationships. 113
In the early part of the twentieth century, a rallying call came from
Roscoe Pound, eminent legal scholar and professor of law at Harvard
University, to re-evaluate the ability of law to remedy every social
problem.11 4 "'When men demand much of law,"' Pound warned, "'when
they seek to devolve upon it the whole burden of social control,....
enforcement of law comes to involve many difficulties."' 11 5 Pound's
commentary on the role of law in our society heralded reform within the
legal system and renewed interest in alternative ways of resolving disputes,
such as arbitration and mediation, also known as "conciliation."' 16
In the decades that followed, ADR gained popularity as a beneficial
means of resolving certain types of disputes. For example, several states and
some municipalities created mediation programs to resolve labor-
management disputes, 117 and by the 1930s and 1940s, the use of grievance
procedures and arbitration to resolve unionized labor disputes was practiced
routinely throughout the United States. 118 Arbitration and conciliation also
109 See id. at 10.
110 Id. at9.
111 See id. at 19-46 (discussing dispute resolution outside the courtroom context in
colonial America).
112 See id.
113 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 165-66
(1994).
114 See AUERBACH, supra note 4, at 96.
115 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting statement of Roscoe Pound).
116 See id.
117 See LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING DISPuTEs 6 (1994).
118 See id. In 1947 Congress created the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
an agency specifically dedicated to the resolution of labor disputes. See id.
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found a footing in the changing legal environment. Arbitration was the more
successful of the alternative means of resolving disputes, eagerly accepted by
contracting parties in the commercial arena as potentially offering speedier
and more inexpensive procedures, free from lawyers. 119 Several cities and
communities, on the other hand, adopted conciliation programs as an
alternative means for the urban poor who could not afford to pay the expense
of traditional litigation or confront the delays often associated with it. 120 At
that time, however, ADR was not widely encouraged or promoted by the
federal legislature or the federal courts.
This began to change in 1976, however, when Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger of the United States Supreme Court organized the Roscoe E. Pound
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice ("Pound Conference"). 121 This conference revisited ideas raised by
Pound sixty years earlier questioning the ability of the courts to solve all of
society's ills and advocating alternative ways of resolving disputes. 122 The
Pound Conference, which perhaps was convened in response to the litigation
explosion experienced by the United States in the 1960s,123 was the first
major step by the federal government to address formalizing ADR
procedures in the federal courts. As such, the Pound Conference generally is
considered the birth of the modem ADR movement. 124 The conference
brought together judges, legal scholars, lawyers, court administrators, and
community leaders to discuss a variety of issues affecting the administration
of justice in America, including concern over the increasing volume of
litigation, access to the courts, and fairness and appropriateness of
procedures.125
During the last few decades since the Pound Conference, the federal
legislature and federal judiciary have initiated a more organized movement to
develop formalized alternative dispute resolution techniques and to establish
effective institutions for their implementation. 126 In the 1970s, federal district
119 See AUERBACH, supra note 4, at 101-02.
120 See id. at 97. Cleveland, New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia all implemented
conciliation programs during the early decades of the twentieth century. See id. at 97-98.
While well intentioned, such a system obviously, and rightly, drew criticism for creating
a "two-tier justice system," one for the poor and one for the more affluent. Id. at 100-01.
121 See SINGER, supra note 117, at 6-7.
122 See AUERBACH, supra note 4, at 123.
123 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 10 (indicating that a
significant increase in litigation occurred in the 1960s).
124 See AUERBACH, supra note 4, at 123.
125 See SINGER, supra note 117, at 7.
126 See id.
409
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courts sporadically began instituting mediation and arbitration programs. 127
In 1988, as a' pilot program for studying ADR techniques, Congress
authorized ten federal district courts to establish mandatory arbitration
programs and ten other districts to establish voluntary arbitration
programs. 12 8
Thereafter, Congress passed The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990129
(CJRA), which was the major impetus for federal district courts to implement
systematic ADR programs. 130 The CJRA mandated the creation of an
advisory committee in all district courts to address ways of reducing the cost
and delay of civil litigation. 131 To accomplish that goal, the CJRA
specifically suggested, among other things, that the advisory committees
consider the development of ADR programs in the federal district courts,
such as mediation, mini-trials, and summary jury trials. 132 As a consequence
of the CJRA, almost all of the ninety-four federal district courts eventually
developed some form of ADR. 133
The CJRA did not, however, require the federal courts to adopt ADR
programs, and as a result, the nature of the programs adopted by the federal
courts varied significantly from district to district and were implemented on a
voluntary and often experimental basis. 134 More recently, perhaps to give
ADR programs a greater presence and credibility within the federal court
system, the legislature recently passed the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act of 1998135 ("ADR Act"), which incorporated three new concepts for
ADR programs in the federal courts. First, the ADR Act mandates all federal
district courts to implement ADR programs. 136 Second, to the extent a
district has a program, it must evaluate its effectiveness and adopt necessary
improvements. 137 Third, the ADR Act requires the appointment of a judicial
127 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 8, at 3.
128 See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994)).
129 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
130 See SINGER, supra note 117, at 11.
131 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 472.
132 See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994) (Congressional Statement of Findings) (setting
forth Congress's finding that "[e]vidence suggests that an effective litigation management
and cost delay and reduction program should incorporate ... utilization of alternative
dispute resolution programs in appropriate cases").
133 See SINGER, supra note 117, at 11.
134 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 8, at 3, 66.
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employee with knowledge in ADR practices and procedures "to implement,
administer, oversee, and evaluate" the ADR program. 138
It is particularly notable that the legislature specifically acknowledged in
the ADR Act that for ADR programs to be effective they must be supported
by the bench and bar and adequately administered by the court. 139 In other
words, it is not sufficient for the federal courts simply to adopt ADR
programs in theory; rather, the court also must embrace fully the concept that
ADR can be a meaningful and effective, albeit different, manner of resolving
disputes.
B. Mediation and Settlement in the Federal District Courts
While mediation can take on a variety of different forms in practice, 140 it
generally can be defined as a nonbinding process in which an impartial third
party "'assists disputing parties in reaching a mutually satisfactory
resolution."' 1 41 Closely related to court-annexed mediation, yet distinct-from
it, is the judicial settlement conference.142 It is particularly relevant to
include the judicial settlement conference in this general discussion of
mediation because, as previously discussed, it procedurally resembles
138 Id. The ADR act specifically directs the district courts to encourage the use of
alternative dispute resolution and permits each district, if it wishes, to compel mediation
and early neutral evaluation. See id.
139 See id.
140 Classic mediation is facilitative--"to help the parties find the solutions to
underlying problems giving rise to the litigation." PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 8,
at 65. In facilitative mediation, the mediator is an expert in process rather than the
substance of the legal or factual matter at issue in the litigation. See id. Conversely, in
evaluative mediation, the mediator assesses the potential outcome of the litigation as a
settlement tool, often employing a special expertise in the particular area of law (e.g.,
securities regulation) or in a particular technical or scientific field (e.g., computer
programming). See id. at 65-66. Most federal courts do not identify which form of
mediation they utilize. See id. at 66; see also Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court
Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 53-54 (1996).
Nolan-Haley observes a broad spectrum of views regarding the mediation process:
At one end of the spectrum is the instrumentalist vision of mediation as an efficient
means of managing court calendars-a perfunctory process which settles cases and
clears dockets. At the other extreme is a more noble vision of mediation as a process
of moral development which helps individuals realize their ends and develop a
stronger sense of efficaciousness.
Id. (citations omitted).
141 Nolan-Haley, supra note 140, at 52-53 (quoting KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH,
MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 16-18 (1994)).
142 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 8, at 65.
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Chinese "mediation."' 143 Within the last decade, mediation has emerged as
the most popular of the court-annexed federal ADR programs. 144 One of the
hallmarks of mediation and one of the primary reasons for its relative
popularity is its 'capacity to expand traditional settlement discussion and
broaden resolution options, often by going beyond the legal issues in
controversy." ' 45 It is a flexible process that is "tailorable" to a variety of
disputes. 146
Although the way mediation programs are implemented within the
federal district courts varies widely from district to district, 147 there are
several general common characteristics that can be noted. The judge assigned
to the case is typically responsible for determining whether the matter is
appropriate for mediation. 148 Although the parties usually participate in the
decision to submit the case to mediation, most districts permit the judge to
order mediation without the consent of the parties. 149 Most federal district
court mediators are nonjudicial personnel, serving the court on a part-time or
ad hoc basis.150 Federal court mediators "almost exclusively" are practicing
attorneys who are selected from an official court mediator roster, appointed
by the judge, or selected by the parties with the judge's approval. 15 1 Federal
courts generally require some form of minimum experience, training, or
certification of their mediators. 152  The qualification and training
requirements to be a mediator in the Federal District Court for the Southern
143 See supra Part II.B.
144 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 8, at 4.
145 Magistrate Judge J. Daniel Breen, Mediation and the Magistrate Judge, 26 U.
MEM. L. REv. 1007, 1014 (1996) (quoting CENTER FOR PUB. REsouRcEs, JUDGE'S
DESKBOOK ON COURT ADR (Elizabeth Plapinger et al. eds., 1993)).
146 Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Multi-Door Contract and Other Possibilities, 13
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 303, 316 (1998).
147 See generally PLAPINGER & SHAW, supra note 19; PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA,
supra note 8.
148 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 8, at 66.
149 See id. Most federal district courts refer cases to mediation on a case by case
basis, in contrast to a few courts that refer cases on the basis of the nature of the dispute
(e.g., personal injury or contract). See id. The rationale behind this is that the "ADR
process is dependent upon many factors, most of which are unique to the controversy
being considered" and includes such things as "the relationship of the parties and the
attitude of the parties toward ADR .... " PLAPINGER & SHAW, supra note 19, at 12.
Additionally, nearly all districts "exclude certain categories of cases from mediation,
such as administrative appeals, prisoner civil rights cases, and writs." PLAPINGER &
STIENSTRA, supra note 8, at 66.
150 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 8, at 9.
151 See id. at 66.
152 See id. at 9.
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District of New York are typical in that a mediator "must have been a
member of any state's bar for five years, be admitted to practice in the
district, have completed the court's two-day mediation training, and be
certified by the chief judge as competent to perform the duties of a
mediator."153 In the majority of districts, parties usually share equally in the
cost of mediation, paying the mediator the market rate for her services, or
they are charged a fee by the court, whether participation is voluntary or
mandatory. 154
Currently, however, the judicial settlement conference is used much
more widely in the federal courts as a means of achieving assisted, negotiated
settlement. 155 Virtually all cases filed in the federal courts are resolved
through settlement, and a significant portion of those disputes are resolved
with the assistance of the court. 156 Long a part of the United States civil
litigation experience, a federal judge's participation and facilitation of
settlement negotiations "first was recognized formally only in the 1983"
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 157 The current form of
Rule 16, which sets forth the objectives and parameters of the initial pretrial
conference, specifically empowers the judge to facilitate settlement of the
case.1 58 Indeed, the judge's obligation to facilitate settlement is indicative of
a trend in American jurisprudence of an increasingly active judiciary that
generally has more control and responsibility over the pretrial process. 159
While the judicial settlement conference and court-annexed mediation
arguably serve similar functions, the judicial settlement discussions are more
closely associated with the adversarial process in which discussions
concerning settlement and litigation planning may be commingled. 160 For
example, judicial settlement discussions may occur in the Rule 16 settlement
conference, in which there is also an opportunity for the parties to establish a
discovery schedule, arrange for motion filing, and allow for the amendment
of pleadings. 161 While settlement discussions are an objective of the
153 Id. at 200.
154 See id. at 66.
155 See id. at 65.
156 See Adams, supra note 92, at 429 (citing 1990 ADMIN. OFF. CTs. ANN. REP. tbl.
C-5).
157 Arthur Miller, Litigation'in America Today, Wis. B. BULL., Apr. 1988, at 9, 33.
158 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9).
159 See Adams, supra note 92, at 433-35; see also Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374,376-86 (1982).
160 See Adams, supra note 92, at 428; see also David A. Rammelt, Note, "Inherent
Power" and Rule 16: How Far Can a Federal Court Push the Litigant Toward
Settlement?, 65 IND. L.J. 965, 970 (1990).
161 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(6), (7).
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conference, settlement is approached on an ad hoc basis with little formal
structure, and the litigants and judge attempt to reach a settlement by "sitting
down and hammering out a satisfactory resolution through
negotiation ... ."162 On the other hand, court-annexed mediation is intended
to be a more structured process that employs systematic methods for
facilitating settlement, usually conducted by a third-party neutral other than
the judge. 163
IV. CHINA'S COURT MEDIATION MODEL IN THE UNITED STATES
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
"Law is always more than rules, procedures, statutes and precedents, or
courts and lawyers. It is, ultimately, an ideology, a set of beliefs
and a system of integrated values ....,,164
As can be seen from the history of China and the United States, legal
procedures are interconnected with the culture in which they exist. 165
Because procedures that govern dispute resolution are created by people
living in a certain place at a certain time and who possess particular and
identifiable values, 166 they are "culture-specific.' ' 167 In China, it is not
surprising that its historically strong preference for harmony coupled with the
often inaccessible and unreliable court system have encouraged the voluntary
resolution of disputes through mediation. It is equally understandable why, in
the United States, with the widely shared belief in and adherence to the rule
of law and the availability of a relatively predictable and respected court
system to enforce it, Americans have come to value and rely on traditional
litigation over all other forms of dispute resolution.
When comparing the Chinese and American court systems and the
procedures each system has developed for resolving disputes, it is somewhat
striking how, to a remarkable degree, each is a reverse image of the other,
with each country seeking to improve its legal system by adopting qualities
of the other. 168 In China, legal reformers recognize the need for greater
162 Ramelt, supra note 160, at 970.
163 See id.
16 4 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 142 (1983).
165 See Chase, supra note 20, at 14.
16 6 See id. at 14-15 (citing MIRJAN DAMA8KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE
AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO LEGAL PROCESS 8-23, 240-41 (1974-
1975)).
167 Oscar G. Chase, Some Observations on the Cultural Dimension in Civil
Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 861, 866 (1997).
168 See Hauling, supra note 52, at 211.
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confidence in the Chinese judiciary through better training of judges,
codification of laws, and systematic application of those laws, especially in
light of its relatively recent economic growth and interaction with the world
economic community.169 By contrast, acknowledgement has been increasing
in America that the rule of law and traditional litigation are not always the
most effective means of resolving disputes, and there is a strong movement
to promote alternative methods such as mediation. 170
As reforms proceed in each country, thoughtful consideration must be
given to the impact such changes will have on their respective citizens and
whether a proposed change is appropriate, given the culture of the receiving
community. For example, if procedural reforms "depart from widely shared
values in the relevant jurisdiction," they will not be well received. 171
Furthermore, to the extent such reforms are implemented, any conflict with
widely shared cultural values "will reduce public confidence in the validity
of the legal system. ' 172 Thus, as mediation procedures are developed and
implemented in the United States federal courts, it should be considered
whether such reforms will be accepted by American litigants, and, if so,
given what is known about traditions and values regarding litigation, how to
best implement such reforms so that public confidence in the legal system is
not diminished.
In considering China's mediation process with these important principles
in mind, there is evidence that the court-performed nature of that system
would translate well to the federal courts, but a wholesale application of
China's process would be inconsistent with longstanding values underlying
the American judiciary. Until the federal district courts take more
responsibility for directing the mediation process with the same dedication
that has earned the courts their distinguished reputation in handling litigation,
they may not witness the high level of public confidence in mediation that
litigation enjoys. Because mediation currently is not being implemented in a
court-performed fashion as in China, but rather in a court-annexed manner,
this could be the reason why only a small percentage of American litigants
voluntarily participate in mediation in the federal courts.
The courts must be careful, however, not to merge the concepts and
procedures of litigation and mediation as China has done. Much of the
strength of the rule of law in this country can be attributed to the fierce
independence and impartiality of the judge presiding over the dispute.
Expecting a judge to maintain an impartial distance from the dispute, yet at
the same time, to solicit information regarding litigants' interests for
169 See Cohen, supra note 54, at 795-96.
170 See supra Part II.
171 Chase, supra note 167, at 866.
172 Id.
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settlement purposes, places the judge in an awkward position and may cause
litigants to be hesitant to share their concerns openly. 173 Developing
mediation as a process separate from litigation, but fully supported,
sanctioned, and encouraged by the federal courts, strikes the proper balance
in presenting the fullest range of opportunity for litigants to settle their
disputes as fairly and efficiently as possible.
A. Acceptance of Mediation in America
While the United States and China demonstrate vast cultural differences,
both countries appear to value the settlement of disputes prior to litigation,
though perhaps for different reasons. The Chinese place a high value on
societal harmony and, as a culture, welcome settlement through mediation. 174
Even if a litigant in China were to hold a different philosophy from that of
Confucius or communism, mediation nonetheless often would be preferred
over litigation due to the unpredictability of the Chinese court system. 175
Although American litigants likely would not find themselves choosing
mediation for the same reasons a Chinese litigant would, mediation and other
settlement methods are still valued in the United States for the efficiency,
flexibility, and risk avoidance that they afford. 176
The concept of negotiated settlement is not foreign to American litigants.
Settlement is an integral part of the dispute resolution process in the federal
courts and accounts for resolution of over ninety percent of all cases filed
there.177 As mediation is simply a process of negotiated settlement with the
assistance of a third party neutral,178 a practice in which litigants routinely
participate, philosophical acceptance of institutionalized mediation in the
United States is likely.
In particular, mediation offers a variety of benefits to the litigants. The
primary impetus for the development of mediation programs in the courts
was to ease docket congestion and provide litigants with speedier and more
173 See Stephen Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective
Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 279, 284 (1982)
(stating that "[t]he separation of the mediatory function from the power to issue a final
and binding decision ... means that the parties need not fear that the facts disclosed to
the mediator in an effort to obtain a settlement will be used against them in the event no
settlement is reached").
174 See supra Part II.
175 See supra Part II.B.1.
176 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 92.
177 See Adams, supra note 92, at 429.
178 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 91.
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affordable results. 179 They have come to offer, however, much more. Equally
important are such benefits as flexibility, control over outcome, and interest-
based resolutions in which it is possible that a dispute can be resolved with
both sides being "winners." 180 A trial does not offer such benefits. Although
traditional litigation seeks to find "truth," many disputes are impervious to
even the powerful "truth-revealing" function of litigation. 181 In many
circumstances, litigants are more than satisfied with harmony and reasonable
comprise than with the chance at their "pound of flesh."182
Moreover, there is also a growing understanding in American courts that
various methods may be used for successfully resolving disputes, and
different methods may be preferred depending upon the nature of the
dispute.183 For example, where the public revelation of "truth" is a party's
primary concern, a trial might be the best way to resolve the dispute.
184
However, where maintaining a business or personal relationship with an
adversary is of interest, mediation might be the appropriate choice, rather
than highly contentious litigation. 185 One of the most basic functions of
government is generally to assist in resolving disputes that its citizens cannot
resolve on their own.186 Adjudication is only one of many ways a
government, and more particularly a court, can resolve a dispute,187 and
indeed, the vast majority of cases filed in federal court are never
adjudicated. 188 A commentary in the Judicial Conference of the United
States's Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts in 1995 acknowledged that
a "conventional bench or jury trial is very expensive and not the best
resolution for every kind of dispute initiated in the district courts. Often, a
fair settlement by the parties... is the preferable resolution.... "189 -
179 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 § 102, 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994)
(Congressional Statement of Findings).
180 See Brazil, supra note 11, at 74.
181 Id. at 73-74.
182 See id. at 74.
183 See id.
184 See id. at 73.
185 See id. at 74.
186 See id. at 73.
187 See generally Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address
Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976); Stipanowich, supra
note 146, at 308-11 (summarizing Frank E. A. Sander's "multi-door courthouse"
approach).
188 See Adams, supra note 92, at 429 (citing 1990 ADMIN. OFF. CTs. ANN. REP. tbl.
C-5).
189 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 70.
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Accordingly, in light of American litigants' demonstrated willingness to
settle disputes and the shared goals of mediation and court settlement, the
institution of voluntary mediation programs is conceptually consistent with
American values. Although the federal courts and their litigants may have no
philosophical bias against mediation as a settlement facilitation method,
mediation procedures must be established and implemented to instill
confidence in those who use them. If they are not, the federal courts will
never experience increased interest by litigants and their counsel in the
process.
B. Implementing China's Court-Performed Mediation Model
A comparison of the mediation process in China to various federal court
mediation programs reveals one very notable general difference that could
influence public perception of and confidence in mediation in these two
countries. In China, the court takes primary responsibility for directing and
performing mediation.190 The federal district courts, on the other hand,
involve themselves much more tangentially in the process. 191 If federal
courts were to adopt a more court-performed approach to mediation
programs, it is possible that more American litigants increasingly would
perceive the process as valid and worthwhile.
The very term "court-annexed" mediation, commonly used to refer to
federal court mediation programs, aptly captures the manner in which most
United States federal district courts' mediation programs are offered to
litigants. They are procedures associated with, but somehow independent
from, the customary and legitimate duties of the court. When a matter is
identified by a federal judge or court administrator as potentially benefiting
from mediation, the case generally is referred to a lawyer for mediation who
serves on a part-time or ad hoc basis and who may or may not have the skill,
training, or experience to properly mediate, as the requirements for mediators
are not very extensive.1 92 In addition, while the mediators are technically
agents of the court when they perform their duties as mediators, they are not
court personnel. Litigants generally also pay an additional fee for
participation in federal mediation programs. 193
In light of these factors, the perceived quality of mediation stands in
sharp contrast to federal court litigation, which is very highly regarded.
Federal judges are not only official court personnel, but are highly trained
190 See supra Part lI.B.
191 See supra Part IH.
192 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 8, at 9, 66.
193 See id. at 66.
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and accomplished in the law. Moreover, American judges possess an aura of
power and prestige in our society, especially Article M federal judges.194 For
many attorneys, the judiciary's status significantly contributes to the ability
to settle cases in judicial conferences. 195 To the American litigant and his
lawyers, there is a vast difference between the perceived quality and
authority of judicial personnel adjudicating matters and those mediating
them. The natural consequence of the minimal court investment in mediation
is that litigants will view mediation as a "second class" remedy and bypass
participation, despite its potential advantages. Whether intentional, as a result
of inadequate funding, or a product of poor design, the court-annexed quality
of federal mediation programs have the effect of marginalizing mediation as
a secondary and less-preferred method of dispute resolution.
In comparison, mediation in China is offered and, more importantly, is
perceived, by litigants on comparable terms as litigation. Mediation in China
is clearly the sole responsibility of the court and an integral part of its
customary civil procedure for handling disputes. 196 Judges or a collegiate
panel of judges perform both mediation and litigation, depending upon the
parties' preference. 197 There are no discrepancies in training or education
between judges and mediators because the officials who preside over
disputes perform both functions. There are also no additional costs asso6iated
with mediation. In short, mediation is not offered by the Chinese courts or
perceived by its litigants as an inferior method of resolving disputes. Thus,
although China's legal system generally has recognized deficiencies in need
of reform, Chinese litigants have no reason to have less confidence in
mediation than they would in the litigation process.
Establishing institutional mediation programs in the federal district
courts as a court-performed process that is a customary and legitimate
responsibility of the court, rather than a court-annexed process that is novel
or experimental or simply required by federal law, is an important factor in
increasing the credibility of federal court mediation. Because of the respect
that American litigants have for judges and the value they place on having a
fair and neutral forum in which to obtain justice, mediation must be
structured more integrally with the court process to earn the trust and
194 See INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: CIVIL PROCEDURE
21-27 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1987); see also U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1 (providing that
"[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish").195 See Adams, supra note 92, at 447 (quoting WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL
SUITS: LITIGATORS' VIEWS ABOUT APPROPRIATE ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR
FEDERAL JUDGES 2 (1985)).
19 6 See Civil Procedure Law art. 86.
197 See id.
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confidence of litigants. For example, litigants likely will have greater
confidence in the mediation process, and consequently voluntarily participate
more frequently, if the federal courts assign mediation duties to full-time,
highly trained court personnel rather than privately practicing attorneys
employed by the court. Mediation also should be made available to litigants
in the federal district courts at no added expense to reinforce the perception
that accessibility to meditation is a traditional and expected part of the
dispute resolution process. Fee-based mediation programs imply that the
process is inferior and therefore does not warrant funding like traditional
litigation. 198 Offering mediation on a more comparable basis with litigation
would enhance public confidence in the mediation process by sending a
message to society that mediation can be an appropriate, effective, and fair
way to resolve disputes. This enhanced credibility likely will engender
increased good faith participation in mandatory mediation programs and
influence potential litigants to contemplate more seriously the voluntary use
of mediation both before and after filing a formal legal action.
C. Departure from China
While adopting China's court-performed mediation methods would be
beneficial to the federal courts to assist parties in resolving disputes, one
particular aspect of China's process which would not translate well to the
federal district courts is using the judge who is assigned to adjudicate the
dispute to perform the mediation. Given the role of federal district court
judges and the nature of mediation generally, the judge assigned to
adjudicate a particular dispute is not the appropriate individual to perform
mediation of that same dispute. Although China's court-performed model of
mediation bears a remarkable resemblance to the judicial settlement
conference, it often differs significantly from the facilitative mediation that is
utilized in most federal district court mediation programs. 199 The potential
benefits of mediation more likely would be realized by using mediators who
ultimately will not adjudicate the dispute.
Requiring the judge to conduct the mediation would infringe upon one of
the most fundamental values American litigants have for the courts, namely,
198 Approximately 31 of 51 federal court-annexed mediation programs operate to
some degree on a fee-based system. See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 8, at 36-48.
Typically, the parties share in the cost of mediation equally and pay the mediator the
market rate. See id. at 66. Several districts require payment of a specific hourly rate of
$150 per hour (some examples are the Federal District Courts for the Northern District of
California, the Southern District of Alabama, and the Southern District of Florida). See
id. at 36-48.
199 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 8, at 65.
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judicial neutrality. Judges generally are uncomfortable with discussing the
relative merits of a case in a manner that may be perceived as revealing bias
or favoritism for one party or another.200 Moreover, mediation often requires
a party to reveal its true interests in a dispute to the mediator in private
caucus or to be candid with the mediator concerning the merits of its legal or
factual arguments.201 Human nature being what it is, many parties are wary
of conceding issues or admitting to a weakness in the presence of a person
who, if settlement cannot be reached, has the authority to decide the
matter.202 The reasonable fear is that a judge's decision will be influenced
significantly if she knows the parties' true interests and attitudes towards
their cases' merits and that the decision would be based on, or significantly
influenced by, these elements rather than admissible facts and applicable
law.203
What can be done, however, to honor the high value that Americans
place on judicial neutrality and to narrow the wide chasm between the
perceived quality of adjudication and the perceived quality of mediation in
the federal courts is to offer mediation with full-time, trained mediators or
with magistrate judges trained in mediation.204 Full-time mediators working
closely with judges to identify appropriate cases for mediation will have the
imprimatur of the court and the concomitant prestige that goes with it.20 5
However, the confidentiality of the mediation would be maintained, allowing
the parties to engage without hesitancy in more open discussions in
accordance with interest-based mediation principles.
In addition, mediation is a specialized process that, unlike the ad hoc
discussions typical of the judicial settlement conference, warrants a uniquely
200 See Bundy, supra note 92, at 61-62; see also WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE
APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 449-538 (1988)
(discussing the judicial role in the settlement conference).
201 See ROY J. LEWIcKI ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF NEGOTIATION 206 (1997).
2 02 See Adams, supra note 92, at 448-49.
203 See id. (explaining that parties will be less candid with an individual mediating a
dispute about the nature and extent of their true interests if the individual mediating the
claim will have the authority to decide the dispute because they will fear disclosures
made during the mediation will be used against them if no agreement is reached).
204 The use of magistrate judges as mediators has been reported to be highly
successful in the Western District of Tennessee, where the number of settlement
conferences in which magistrates served as neutrals rose from 51 to 190 between 1991
and 1995, and where some magistrate judges reported partial or total settlement rates as
high as 75%. See Breen, supra note 145, at. 1008. Additionally, a judge also may be used
to mediate as long as they are not the judge assigned to adjudicate the dispute. As a
practical matter, however, a judge's time might be "spent more efficiently" managing and
adjudicating his own caseload. Id.
205 See Brazil, supra note 11, at 75.
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tailored process to be faithfully implemented.20 6 Mediation usually proceeds
from a specific theoretical model of dispute resolution and requires special
training, skills, and procedures. 20 7 It also can take considerable time, with
mediation extending over several sessions. By contrast, settlement
discussions conducted by judges are, to a large degree, still an unstructured,
unsystematic, ad hoc process. 20 8 Judges may or may not have the time,
inclination, training, or skill to facilitate the negotiation effectively. 20 9 For
mediation to be implemented properly, it must be recognized as a separate
and distinct process from ad hoc settlement discussions.
Both Chinese court mediation and the American judicial settlement
conference already have a high settlement rate, and it is unlikely that
mediation programs will increase the settlement rate appreciably. Rather, the
likely and welcome result of institutionalized mediation would be to resolve
disputes more efficiently by employing effective dispute resolution
techniques early in the dispute, saving both the courts' and litigants' time and
money and offering litigants an opportunity for more flexible, less
distributive results than is possible at trial.210 The aim of a systematic
mediation program, fully integrated with the federal court, is to make the
process of settlement more efficient and more satisfying.
V. CONCLUSION
While the effectiveness of China's court-performed mediation model is
intertwined with a cultural experience vastly different from our own, a court-
performed mediation system, in which mediation is established as a
customary and appropriate court function, can function not only effectively
in the United States federal district courts, but also likely will stimulate
greater voluntary participation in mediation by litigants. This is so because
the goals of mediation are consistent with American values. The court-
annexed mediation model currently used in most federal district courts is not
as effective as a court-performed model because it sends a message to
litigants that mediation is a novel and inferior dispute resolution process, not
worthy of being a customary function of court personnel or of funding like
206 See generally Bush, supra note 11.
207 See Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S.C. L. REV. 305,
307-08 (1971). See generally Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators'
Orientations, Strategies and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEG. L.
REV. 7 (1996) (identifying four general models of mediation and discussing the various
strategies and techniques utilized in each).
208 See Rammelt, supra note 160, at 971.
209 See Adams, supra note 92, at 450-51.
210 See Brazil, supra note 11, at 76.
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traditional litigation. Given the historical reverence that Americans have for
the federal judiciary, it is not surprising that such marginalization of the
mediation process results in low levels of interest by litigants. Once federal
district courts assume greater responsibility for direction of the federal
mediation programs and implement them as a fully integrated part of the
courts' regular and customary functions, litigants will gain a greater respect
for mediation and seek out its potential benefits more readily.

